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INTRODUCTION 
In hindsight, the year 1990 was a crossroads in environmental 
and regulatory policy generally and in the regulation of food 
specifically. And two different narratives capture the competing 
regulatory choices presented at that crossroads. The first, a 
conventional narrative, finds mounting evidence of what many regard 
as the dominant avenues of regulatory reform in environmental 
policymaking: market-based incentives and risk-based decision-
making.1 The second, alternative narrative finds the signs of a much 
more fundamental reform project. 
Under the conventional narrative, 1990 is often remembered for 
amendments to the Clean Air Act that inaugurated the country’s 
largest experiment with constructed environmental markets—a 
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 1. The literature on reforming environmental law and policy with the use of market-based 
incentives is large. See, e.g., Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Putting the Market to Work for 
Conservation: The Evolving Use of Market-Based Mechanisms to Achieve Environmental 
Improvement In and Across Multiple Media, 14 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 151 (2006); E. Donald 
Elliott, Environmental Markets and Beyond: Three Modest Proposals for the Future of 
Environmental Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 245 (2001); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and 
the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, 
Models for Environmental Regulation: Central Planning Versus Market-Based Approaches, 19 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547 (1992). The literature on reforming environmental law through 
various forms of risk analysis is equally large. See, e.g., Matthew B. Adler, Against “Individual 
Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121 (2005); Steve P. 
Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to 
Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957 (2001); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Risk 
in the Republic, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (1997); David A. Dana, Review Essay, Setting 
Environmental Priorities: The Promise of a Bureaucratic Solution, 74 B.U. L. REV. 365 (1994). 
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nationwide “cap-and-trade” sulfur dioxide market2 now fêted not 
only as a template for a worldwide market in greenhouse gases3 but 
also as a model for the development of more far-reaching markets in 
ecosystem services.4 The year is also recalled for the qualified 
endorsement given quantitative and comparative risk assessment by 
the Environmental Protection Agency’s Science Advisory Board 
(SAB).5 Thereafter, the SAB’s report would be cited frequently for 
evidence that risk-based environmental regulation was an idea whose 
time had come.6 
In the regulation of food, it was easy to see in 1990 the influence 
of these conventional reforms, especially the prevalence of risk-based 
regulation. Two highly visible controversies over food—one domestic 
and one international—were largely framed and resolved in terms of 
risk assessment. Domestically, 1990 marked the conclusion of a 
regulatory battle over the pesticide daminozide (known by its trade 
name, Alar) in which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
the Uniroyal Corporation (Alar’s chief manufacturer), and 
environmental groups each contested the safety of Alar through 
 
 2. Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, sec. 401, §§ 401–416, 104 Stat. 2399, 
2584–631 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2000)); see also Brennan Van Dyke, Note, 
Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 YALE L.J. 2707 (1991). 
 3. See, e.g., Jennifer Yelin-Kefer, Note, Warming Up to an International Greenhouse Gas 
Market: Lessons from the U.S. Acid Rain Experience, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 221 (2001); Isabel 
Rauch, Developing a German and an International Emissions Trading System—Lessons from 
U.S. Experiences with the Acid Rain Program, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 307 (2000). But see 
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 
108 YALE L.J. 677, 775 n.361 (1999) (noting important differences between the U.S. sulfur 
dioxide trading program and proposed international greenhouse gas trading markets). 
 4. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 261, 261–62 (2000) (describing emissions trading under the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments as an example and precursor to broader experiments with market-like 
mechanisms to protect ecosystems). 
 5. RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION STRATEGIES COMM’N, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY SCI. 
ADVISORY BD., REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990). 
 6. See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, The EPA Science Advisory Board’s Report on 
“Reducing Risk”: Some Overarching Observations Regarding the Public Interest, 22 ENVTL. L. 
149, 151 (1992) (“[T]he remarkable SAB report adds significantly to the policy debate 
concerning environmental decision making by providing a workable analytical approach to 
today’s and tomorrow’s environmental problems.”); John S. Applegate, The Perils of 
Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. 
L. REV. 261, 284 & n.120 (1991) (citing the SAB report to support a claim of “centrality” of 
quantitative risk assessment to EPA policymaking); William Reilly, Taking Aim Toward 2000: 
Rethinking the Nation’s Environmental Agenda, 21 ENVTL. L. 1359, 1366 (1991) (referring to 
“valuable suggestions” from the SAB report). 
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opposing risk-based conclusions involving competing exposure 
models and dose-response relationships.7 Internationally, the year 
also saw battle lines drawn over hormone-treated beef in a dispute 
between the United States, where the addition of hormone growth 
implants in livestock was (and still is) common, and the European 
Community (EC), which took final steps to implement its ban on 
imported, hormone-treated meat adopted the previous year.8 The 
battle over beef hormones pitted a risk-based approach to 
environmental issues in international trade (the United States’ 
position) against a precautionary approach (the EC’s position). And, 
within the dispute resolution framework of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the United States’ position would prevail, not 
only in the WTO’s eventual decision in 1997 on bovine growth 
implants,9 but also in a 2006 dispute between the United States and 
Europe over the importation of genetically modified agricultural 
products.10 
But in the regulation of food, the alternative narrative is needed 
to capture fully other events that also transpired in 1990. Broadly 
speaking, this narrative emphasizes the emergence of a cause-based 
approach to environmental reform that seeks fundamental changes in 
production systems or human behavior to prevent such 
 
 7. See, e.g., Marina M. Lolley, Comment, Carcinogen Roulette: The Game Played Under 
FIFRA, 49 MD. L. REV. 975, 984–88 (1990) (discussing different childhood exposure periods 
used in risk assessments relied on by EPA and environmentalists, different dose-response 
factors, and claims by Uniroyal that EPA’s risk assessment contained too many data gaps to 
support regulatory action). 
 8. GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.-EUROPEAN UNION 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE: THE VETERINARY EQUIVALENCY AGREEMENT 2 (1999) (noting that 
the EC in 1990 finished “delisting” plants in the United States that produced hormone-treated 
meat). The beef hormone dispute is discussed generally in Rosemary A. Ford, The Beef 
Hormone Dispute and Carousel Sanctions: A Roundabout Way of Forcing Compliance with 
World Trade Organization Decisions, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 543 (2002). 
 9. The reports of both the WTO’s Hormones Panel and the WTO Appellate Body are 
discussed in Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the “World Trans-science 
Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones 
Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 296–319 (1998); see also George H. Rountree, Note, 
Raging Hormones: A Discussion of the World Trade Organization’s Decision in the European 
Union-United States Beef Dispute, 3 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 607 (1999). 
 10. See WORLD TRADE ORG., EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES—MEASURES AFFECTING THE 
APPROVAL AND MARKETING OF BIOTECH PRODUCTS (Sept. 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/news06_e/291r_e.htm. The WTO’s decision on genetically 
modified organisms is discussed in Jonathan G. Dorn, News & Analysis, The Regulation of 
Genetically Modified Organisms: Why the Biotech Products Case Is a Win-Win Situation for the 
European Union, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10225 (Mar. 2007). 
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environmental harms from arising in the first place.11 In a weak sense, 
Congress captured this alternative approach in the Pollution 
Prevention Act of 1990,12 under which EPA was to promote pollution 
prevention through various information-based measures and by 
encouraging source-reduction efforts by industry.13 But this 
alternative approach was captured more strongly that year by 
developments in “alternative agriculture”—which for purposes of this 
Essay includes “organic agriculture.”14 
The year 1990 was especially important in the development of 
federal policy on organic agriculture. In April of that year, the 
National Academy of Sciences co-sponsored a workshop on research 
initiatives in “sustainable agriculture,”15 following up on a widely 
noted National Academy publication from one year earlier, 
Alternative Agriculture,16 which found evidence that non-conventional 
agricultural systems could markedly reduce environmental 
degradation without significant loss in agricultural productivity.17 
 
 11. Examples of cause-based environmental reforms are discussed in Donald T. Hornstein, 
Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law 
Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 380–85 (1993). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101–13109 (2000). The Pollution Prevention Act is described in E. Lynn 
Grayson, The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990: Emergence of a New Environmental Policy, 22 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10392 (June 1992). 
 13. Grayson, supra note 12; see also Stephan M. Johnson, From Reaction to Proaction: The 
1990 Pollution Prevention Act, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1992). 
 14. The term “organic” when affixed as a food label in the United States has a fixed 
meaning in terms of compliance with the Organic Food Production Act of 1990. More broadly, 
organic agriculture is one of several forms of low-input agriculture that all have in common 
either the elimination or reduction of such chemical growing inputs as fertilizers and pesticides. 
See infra text accompanying notes 109–12. The various forms of alternative agriculture are 
summarized in Hornstein, supra note 11, at 401. 
 15. Charles M. Benbrook, Introduction to SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE RESEARCH AND 
EDUCATION IN THE FIELD: A PROCEEDINGS 1 (Nat’l Acad. of Scis. 1991). 
 16. See COMM’N ON THE ROLE OF ALTERNATIVE FARMING METHODS IN MODERN PROD. 
AGRIC., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE (Nat’l Acad. Press 1989) 
[hereinafter ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE]; see also Christopher B. Connard, Comment, 
Sustaining Agriculture: An Examination of Current Legislation Promoting Sustainable 
Agriculture as an Alternative to Conventional Farming Practices, 13 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 
125, 136 & n.66 (2004) (citing ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE, supra); Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding 
Our Future: Six Philosophical Issues Shaping Agricultural Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 210, 239 n.134 
(1993) (“The book set off an intense controversy in the agricultural community and gave a 
major boost in the national conscience to sustainable agriculture.”). 
 17. ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE, supra note 16, at 9 (“Reduced use of these [chemical] 
inputs lowers production costs and lessens agriculture’s potential for adverse environment and 
health effects without necessarily decreasing—and in some case increasing—per acre crop yields 
and the productivity of livestock management systems.”). 
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Perhaps influenced by these events, Congress passed the Organic 
Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA),18 as part of the 1990 Farm 
Bill.19 The OFPA was, it is safe to say, ironic. It delegated the task of 
promulgating a uniform set of standards for organic farmers, the 
National Organic Program (NOP),20 to the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), the historical and administrative epicenter of 
conventional agriculture in Washington, D.C.21 Once established, the 
NOP would allow organic farmers to market their products under the 
nationwide seal, “USDA Organic.”22 After stumbling badly in its 
initial attempt to implement the delegation,23 the USDA finally 
promulgated regulations for the NOP about a decade later.24 
The incorporation of organic agriculture within federal 
environmental and agricultural policy was significant. In facilitating 
this approach to agriculture, the OFPA brought full circle the deeper 
reform project suggested by Rachel Carson almost four decades 
earlier upon the publication of her widely influential book, Silent 
Spring.25 Several accounts of Silent Spring link its publication to 
legislative reforms of the nation’s central pesticide statute, the 
 
 18. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3935 (1990) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6522 (2000)). 
 19. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 
3359 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 16 U.S.C.). 
 20. See 7 U.S.C. § 6518 (2000); see also Lauren Zeichner, Product vs. Process: Two 
Labeling Regimes for Genetically Engineered Foods and How They Relate to Consumer 
Preference, 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 467, 473 (2004) (“The remaining details of the 
USDA organic certification program were to be developed by the agency, based in part on the 
recommendations of the National Organic Standards Board . . . .”); id. at 474 (“In 1997 the 
USDA published the first proposed rule, establishing the National Organic Program . . . under 
the authority granted by the OFPA.”). 
 21. See Hornstein, supra note 11, at 423–27 (describing USDA’s generally pro-pesticide 
mindset). 
 22. See Zeichner, supra note 20, at 474. 
 23. See Michelle T. Friedland, You Call That Organic?—The USDA’s Misleading Food 
Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379, 383 (2005) (noting that the USDA originally proposed 
in 1997 to classify as “organic” such products or processes as genetically modified seeds and the 
uses of irradiation and sewage sludge, leading to the submission of over 275,603 comments, 
almost all opposing these classifications—“more public comments than any other USDA 
regulation in history”). 
 24. Id. at 384. 
 25. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (40th anniversary ed., Mariner Books 2002). Much 
of Carson’s book originally appeared as a series of articles in the New Yorker. See 
CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS 116–17 (1987) (describing the original 
magazine articles). 
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Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).26 But 
Carson argued for something more fundamental than a broader 
accounting of the health and environmental effects of pesticides. 
Carson concluded Silent Spring with a chapter entitled “The Other 
Road,” in which she called on farmers and agricultural researchers to 
eschew what she termed the “arrogance” of the “control of nature,”27 
and instead to develop solutions to agricultural pests “based on 
understanding of the living organisms they seek to control, and of the 
whole fabric of life to which these organisms belong.”28 Unlike 
regulatory reform based merely on quantifying and prioritizing risks, 
the other road marked by the OFPA led toward a fundamentally 
different form of agriculture. And unlike the artificially constructed 
markets in pollution control established in the 1990 Clean Air Act 
amendments, the OFPA sought to link this different form of 
agriculture directly into the nation’s broader consumer markets. And 
it succeeded. For all the attention given the artificial market for sulfur 
dioxide allowances under the Clean Air Act, its annual market value 
in 2004 was approximately $4 billion.29 In contrast, sales of organic 
food in 2004 were approximately $15.4 billion, up from $12.9 billion in 
2003.30 Organic foods have for years constituted the fastest growing 
segment of the agricultural market.31 The OFPA marked a road that 
has been taken. 
After recounting briefly in Part I the basic contours of organic 
agriculture and USDA’s development of the NOP, this Essay 
squarely addresses in Part II the continuing challenge to the NOP’s 
legitimacy. Specifically, this Essay responds to attacks—typically 
framed in the language of risk assessment—that organic agriculture 
cannot be squared with sound public policy or with what its attackers 
 
 26. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 
88-305, 78 Stat. 190 (1964) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2000)); see also 
Hornstein, supra note 11, at 422–23, 426 (describing the influence Carson’s writings had on the 
congressional revision of FIFRA in 1964). 
 27. CARSON, supra note 25, at 297. 
 28. Id. at 278. 
 29. CHICAGO CLIMATE FUTURES EXCH., THE SULFUR DIOXIDE EMISSION ALLOWANCE 
TRADING PROGRAM: MARKET ARCHITECTURE, MARKET DYNAMICS AND PRICING 7 (2004), 
available at http://www.ccfe.com/education_ccfe/SO2_Background_Drivers_Pricing_PDF.pdf 
(valuing registered trades in 2004 at $4 billion and over-the-counter trades involving forward 
and option contracts at an additional $1–2 billion). 
 30. William J. Friedman, The Framework for Global Organic Food Trade Circa 2005: 
Accomplishments and Challenges, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 361, 365 (2005). 
 31. Id. 
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frequently describe as sound science. The central thesis of this Essay 
is that detractors of organic agriculture too often rest their claims to 
sound science with arbitrarily narrow framing devices that mask the 
full range of benefits that organic agriculture may offer. In that 
regard, the battles over organic agriculture are not unique. In January 
2006, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
sought to hardwire just such a limiting rubric across the entirety of the 
regulatory landscape by proposing, in the name of sound science, a 
national “risk assessment bulletin.”32 In December 2006, a panel of 
the National Academy of Sciences, after conducting an eleven-month 
peer review, took the unprecedented step of returning the proposal to 
OMB as “unscientific” and “unjustified.”33 This Essay discusses how 
the artificially limited perspectives of the rejected OMB proposal 
reflect just the sort of arbitrary argumentation too often marshaled in 
defense of conventional agriculture and against organic foods. 
I.  ORGANIC AGRICULTURE AND THE NATIONAL  
ORGANIC PROGRAM 
Organic agriculture can be understood on three levels, each one 
of which can be helpful to policy and legal analyses. At its broadest 
level, organic agriculture reflects a set of ethical positions—toward 
the environment, toward socioeconomic justice, and toward animal 
welfare—as well as a set of agricultural methods. The International 
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements speaks of four 
overarching principles of organic agriculture—of health,34 ecology,35 
fairness,36 and care37—and stresses their applicability “to agriculture in 
 
 32. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN (2006), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/proposed_risk_assessment_bulletin_ 
010906.pdf [hereinafter OMB BULLETIN]. 
 33. COMM. TO REVIEW THE OMB RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT 
BULLETIN FROM THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (2007), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11811.html [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. 
 34. Int’l Fed’n of Organic Agric. Movements, The Principles of Organic Agriculture, 
http://www.ifoam.org/about_ifoam/principles/index.html (last visited May 10, 2007) (“Organic 
Agriculture should sustain and enhance the health of soil, plant, animal, human and planet as 
one and indivisible.”). 
 35. Id. (“Organic Agriculture should be based on living ecological systems and cycles, work 
with them, emulate them and help sustain them.”). 
 36. Id. (“Organic Agriculture should build on relationships that ensure fairness with regard 
to the common environment and life opportunities[.]”). 
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the broadest sense, including the way people tend soils, water, plants 
and animals” and to the way people “relate to one another and shape 
the legacy of future generations.”38 It is not hard to catch in such 
meta-principles the philosophical, as well as technical, aspects of the 
“other road” that Rachel Carson propounded. And, while still 
describing organic agriculture at this broadest level, it bears mention 
that organic agriculture also has social and organizational 
dimensionality; there are hundreds of regional and local organic 
industry trade groups, each often having slightly varying standards.39 
Moreover, at the international level, in addition to the standards set 
by the private International Federation of Organic Agriculture 
Movements, there are also standards for organic food products set by 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, an entity operating under the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the World 
Health Organization.40 Thus, broadly speaking, organic agriculture 
has all the earmarks of a self-generating, self-policing private 
organization centered on core norms that might simultaneously 
deliver both private goods and public beneficial externalities.41 
 
 37. Id. (“Organic Agriculture should be managed in a precautionary and responsible 
manner to protect the health and well-being of current and future generations and the 
environment.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Friedman, supra note 30, at 362 (“A single database with copies of all of the known 
organic production and processing standards would be immense and not unlike having a set of 
all local zoning regulations or building codes. This is because the organic market is confronted 
with hundreds of private sector standards and governmental regulations . . . .”). 
 40. On the organization of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, see Cindy Joffe Hyman, 
Comment, Food for Thought: Defending the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 Against 
Claims of Protectionism, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1719, 1723 (2000). On the Codex’s specific 
organic standards, see Lawrence Speer, Food Safety: International Food Organization Sets Out 
Guidelines for Organically Produced Foods, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), July 2, 1999, at D7. In 
general, the Codex offers the following definition of organic agriculture: 
“Organic” is a labeling term that denotes products that have been produced in 
accordance with organic production standards and certified by a duly constituted 
certification body or authority. Organic agriculture is based on . . . avoiding the use of 
synthetic fertilizers and pesticides. . . . The primary goal of organic agriculture is to 
optimize the health and productivity of interdependent communities of soil life, 
plants, animals and people. 
Friedman, supra note 30, at 363 (quoting Guidelines for the Production, Processing, Labelling 
and Marketing of Organically Produced Foods, in JOINT FAO/WHO FOOD STANDARDS 
PROGRAMME, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION 9 (July 2005), available at 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/360/CXG_032e.pdf). 
 41. Of the potential value of groups motivated by social norms generally, see Richard H. 
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 356 
(1997) (explaining how private individuals might follow beneficial social norms from which they 
derive individual esteem). Of the social value, if not necessity, for further gains in 
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At a second, narrower level, organic agriculture can be 
understood as one of several “alternative” agricultural systems. All of 
these systems share the goal of reducing, if not eliminating, reliance 
on such chemical or artificial agricultural inputs as conventional 
pesticides and fertilizers. There are roughly four alternative methods 
most often suggested as substitutes. First, there are cultural methods 
of disease, weed, and pest control, such as crop rotations and 
staggered planting dates.42 Second, there are biological control 
methods, such as the release of “beneficial” predatory or parasitic 
insects that can attack pests.43 Third, there are “biorational” pest 
control measures such as pheromone-baited traps.44 And fourth—
although not an option embraced by organic agriculturalists—there is 
“integrated pest management,” (IPM) a “decisionmaking system 
designed to use all ‘suitable’ pest control techniques, including 
chemical pesticides, to keep pest populations below economically 
injurious levels while satisfying environmental and production 
objectives.”45 The National Academy of Sciences spoke of alternative 
agriculture generally when it concluded in 1989 that “[w]ider 
adoption of proven alternative systems would result in even greater 
economic benefits to farmers and environmental gains for the 
nation.”46 
Finally, there is the legal regime governing organic agriculture 
developed under the Organic Foods Production Act. In the late 
1980s, against the backdrop of legislation in over twenty states 
regulating organic food labeling in different ways,47 the organic food 
industry petitioned Congress for legislation that would create a set of 
national standards for organic products.48 The OFPA, from the point 
of view of regulatory design and administrative law, was strikingly 
innovative. At the same time that alternatives to traditional 
 
environmental protection of encouraging the self-referential value of nonlegal social 
institutions, see Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1231–32 
(1995) (suggesting possibilities of gains from non-state-centered solutions). 
 42. Hornstein, supra note 11, at 401 (citing Brian P. Baker, Pest Control in the Public 
Interest: Crop Protection in California, 8 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 31, 33 (1988)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 401 n.174 (explaining that pheromone-baited traps emit chemical scents that draw 
pest insects into devices from which they cannot emerge). 
 45. Id. at 401. 
 46. ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE, supra note 16, at 6. 
 47. Friedland, supra note 23, at 382. 
 48. JEAN M. RAWSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORGANIC AGRICULTURE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: PROGRAM AND POLICY ISSUES 3 (2006). 
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command-and-control regulation such as risk-based decisionmaking 
and market-like incentives were drawing so much attention, the 
OFPA created a system that could tie public environmental and 
ethical values into existing, real markets; that informed the 
development of governmental organic standards with input from a 
National Organic Standards Board composed of nongovernmental 
representatives from different facets of the organic industry; and that 
centered regulatory compliance on a system of approved private-
sector certification rather than a large federal bureaucracy. 
The OFPA is a marketing-oriented statute designed to regularize 
what was at the time a potentially confusing Babel of competing 
standards with an official federal “organic” label.49 Not only was a 
federal label thought useful in promoting consumer confidence in the 
growing organic industry within the United States,50 but it was also 
viewed as helpful in facilitating trade in “a potentially lucrative 
international organic market.”51 For this reason, the OFPA’s primary 
administrative delegation to develop the National Organic Program 
was to the USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS).52 But 
because the AMS had little direct experience with organic agriculture, 
its decisions were to be informed by recommendations from organic 
industry representatives serving on the National Organic Standards 
Board (NOSB).53 Although USDA was slow even to propose 
establishment of the NOP,54 by 2002 final rules had been implemented 
that allowed, among other things, qualifying products to use the 
official USDA “organic” label in conjunction with terms such as “100 
percent organic” or “organic.”55 
 
 49. Id. at 3 (“The industry maintained that federal standards would reduce consumer 
confusion over the many different state and private standards then in use, and would promote 
confidence in the integrity of organic products over the long term.”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.; see also Friedman, supra note 30, at 366 (noting that implementation of the 
National Organic Program was located within the AMS “because it is considered a marketing 
program”). 
 53. See RAWSON, supra note 48, at 3–4 (“The [A]ct established a 15-member National 
Organic Standards Board (NOSB) to ‘assist in the development of standards for substances to 
be used in organic production . . . and to provide recommendations to the Secretary regarding 
implementation.’”). 
 54. AMS’s first proposed rule to establish the NOP was not issued until December 1997, 
some seven years after passage of the OFPA. See National Organic Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 
65,850 (proposed Dec. 16, 1997). 
 55. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.100(a) (2007) (referring to regulatory requirements needed); 
National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548, 80,550 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 
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By two measures, the NOP has been successful. First, in its 
definition of organic farming, even a business-oriented institution like 
the AMS recognized that, broadly speaking, organic agriculture was 
more than simply the application of certain techniques. True to the 
movement’s overarching principles, organic farming was defined 
under the OFPA as “[a] production system that is managed in 
accordance with [OFPA regulations] to respond to site-specific 
conditions by integrating cultural, biological, and mechanical 
practices that foster cycling of resources, promote ecological balance, 
and conserve biodiversity.”56 But second, and as importantly, the 
national system of organic certification has contributed to the 
underlying growth of the organic food market, both domestically and 
internationally. The Congressional Research Service reported in 2006 
(based on 2004 data) that over 11,000 certified organic crop, livestock, 
and handling operations were involved with over 2 million acres of 
certified organic cropland and pasture/rangeland in a domestic 
market that maintained an astonishing annual rate of growth of 20 
percent beginning in 1990.57 By one account, the domestic sale of 
organic foods might exceed $23 billion by 2010, or 3.5 percent of total 
U.S. retail sales (up from $10.4 billion in sales in 2003, accounting 
then for only 2 percent of total U.S. sales).58 Internationally, as of 
2005 organic food production is reported to occur in 110 countries, on 
over 558,000 farms cultivating over 64 million acres,59 with global sales 
maintaining an annual expansion rate of 7–9 percent and having 
already exceeded a total of $25 billion.60 Following the United States’ 
lead in 1990, both Europe and Japan similarly adopted national 
standards for organic products.61 To the extent the OFPA was 
 
205). Generally, the term “organic” may be used for products containing at least 95 percent 
organic materials, whereas the term “100% organic” is reserved for products containing 100 
percent organically produced materials. See Claire S. Carroll, Comment, What Does Organic 
Mean Now? Chickens and Wild Fish Are Undermining the Organic Foods Production Act of 
1990, 14 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 117, 128–29 (2004). 
 56. 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2007). See RAWSON, supra note 48, at 1 (“This definition indicates 
that organic agriculture is both an approach to food production . . . . and a broadly defined 
philosophical approach to farming that puts value on resource efficiency and ecological 
harmony.”). 
 57. RAWSON, supra note 48, at 1–2. 
 58. Id. (citing an estimate from a business journal). 
 59. Friedman, supra note 30, at 364–65. 
 60. Id. at 365. 
 61. See, e.g., id. at 361 (citing Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2092/91 of June 24, 1991 on 
Organic Production of Agricultural Products and Indications Referring Thereto on Agricultural 
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premised on the contribution national standards might make to 
market growth, the NOP has been successful.62 
But there have also been signs that USDA implementation of the 
NOP has misunderstood the full sweep of organic agriculture’s 
principles. The clearest sign occurred in 1997 when the NOP was first 
proposed. Then, the USDA had included the use of genetically 
modified organisms63 among its range of acceptable “organic” 
practices over the strong objection of the NOSB.64 The USDA’s 
reasons for doing so were defensive rather than descriptive. The 
agency pointed to no evidence that organic farmers actually used 
genetically modified organisms, or that such use would be consistent 
with the broader principles of organic agriculture, or even that an 
independent scientific inquiry had led the agency to believe that 
 
Products and Foodstuffs, 1991 O.J. (L 198), 22.7, 1 (on European standards) and Japanese 
Agric. Standards of Organic Agric. Prods., Ministry of Agric., Forestry and Fisheries 
Notification No. 59 of 2000, available at http://www.maff.go.jp [in Japanese] (last visited May 10, 
2007) (on Japanese standards)). 
 62. Certainly, however, there is still work to be done, especially as to the coordination of 
different international standards. In 2002, Japan became the first—and so far, the only—country 
to accept USDA certification for importation of organic goods. See U.S. Dep’t Agric., Japan 
Accepts U.S. Organic Standards for Some Food Exports (Mar. 27, 2002), http://usinfo.org/wf-
archive/2002/020328/epf409.htm (last visited May 10, 2007); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., USDA 
MARKET PROFILE FOR ORGANIC FOOD PRODUCTS 10 (2005), available at http://www.fas.usda. 
gov/agx/organics/USMarketProfileOrganicFoodFeb2005.pdf. 
 63. See Zeichner, supra note 20, at 474. Also included in the proposed rule was the use of 
sewage sludge and irradiation. Id. As a note on terminology, the phrase “genetically modified 
organism” (GMO) is sometimes criticized as overbroad, as it could include any agricultural 
practice (such as traditional cross breeding) that seeks to give a plant or animal a new 
combination of heritable traits, as opposed to the more precise objection to doing so via the 
transfer of altered DNA or via the transfer of one species’ DNA into the cells of another 
species. See Friedland, supra note 23, at 387. Such critics prefer terms such as “biotechnology” 
or “bioengineering” to capture the distinction. Id. In the regulatory history of the NOP, 
however (not to mention the broader social debates surrounding these techniques), the terms 
“genetically modified organism,” “genetic modification,” or “GMOs” are used so frequently to 
capture the meaning of biotechnology that my use of those phrases throughout this Essay is 
unlikely to cause any confusion—and has the historical virtue of using the same terms as were 
used by participants in the development of the NOP. Moreover, the NOSB, in its biotechnology 
policy, preserves much of this distinction when its states, “[g]enetically engineered is defined as: 
Made with techniques that alter the molecular or cell biology of an organism by means that are 
not possible under natural conditions or processes . . . and shall not include breeding, 
conjugation, fermentation, hybridization, in-vitro fertilization, and tissue culture.” Nat’l Organic 
Standards Bd., Biotechnology Policy—1996, http://www.ams.usda.gov/nosb/archives/biotech/ 
policy.html. 
 64. Regarding the incompatibility of genetically modified organisms and organic 
agriculture, the National Organic Standards Board had recommended in 1996 “that the class of 
genetically engineered organisms and their derivatives be prohibited in organic production and 
handling systems.” Nat’l Organic Standards Bd., supra note 63. 
03__HORNSTEIN.DOC 7/20/2007  1:44 PM 
2007] ORGANIC AGRICULTURE 1553 
genetically modified products were either beneficial or free of 
dangers. Rather the agency principally explained that, because the 
United States was otherwise the leading advocate for genetically 
modified agricultural products, it was concerned that excluding the 
use of genetic engineering from the NOP would cause its foreign 
trading partners to believe that the federal government was 
concerned with the safety of food grown with some use of genetic 
engineering.65 The public response to the proposed rule is legendary. 
By one account, public opposition was so enormous—“it was one of 
the largest [public responses] in the history of the federal 
government”66—that USDA was twice required to extend the 
comment period to accommodate the sheer number of critical written 
submissions.67 By another, more than 275,000 comments, almost all 
opposing USDA’s proposed rule, were received.68 In the end, USDA 
retracted the proposal and the final NOP prohibited the use of 
genetic engineering as an approved practice.69 In doing so, the agency 
stated that the OFPA was primarily a marketing statute and that as 
the public overwhelmingly views “organic” foods not to have been 
grown with genetic modification techniques, excluding them was 
necessary to preserve the meaningfulness of the USDA’s “organic” 
label.70 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the USDA’s final 
position was unquestionably consistent with the OFPA. But within 
USDA’s explanation lie shades of a less defensible conclusion: that 
organic agriculture, including the non-utilization of genetically 
modified processes, gains its legitimacy only within the realm of 
public perception and could not survive the scrutiny of full-fledged 
scientific inquiry. The American Crop Protection Association, an 
organization that supports the use of genetic modification in farming, 
came close to stating this explicitly: “The [ACPA] can accept the 
exclusion of modern biotechnology from organic production as an 
‘excluded method’ only with the clear understanding that the organic 
 
 65. Zeichner, supra note 20, at 474–76. 
 66. Carroll, supra note 55, at 127. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Zeichner, supra note 20, at 475. 
 69. National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 
205). 
 70. See, e.g., id. at 80,549 (“A variety of methods [is] used to genetically modify organisms 
or influence their growth and development by means that are not possible under natural 
conditions or processes and are not considered compatible with organic production.”). 
03__HORNSTEIN.DOC 7/20/2007  1:44 PM 
1554 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1541 
designation is in no way an indication of safety or quality but is rather 
a marketing standard.”71 In the remainder of this Essay, I address this 
inference. 
II.  FRAMING THE SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY OVER CONVENTIONAL AND 
ORGANIC AGRICULTURE 
Criticism of nonconventional agriculture is often quite blunt. In 
1978, at congressional hearings on pesticide reform legislation, one 
proponent of conventional agriculture framed the debate in the 
starkest of terms: “[Without pesticides, o]ur concern will not be that 
of a silent spring, but a silent summer, silent autumn, silent winter and 
a silent world. Silence will be broken only by those crying for food. 
The name of that game is famine!”72 Twenty-five years later, shortly 
after USDA adopted the National Organic Program, the science 
correspondent for Reason magazine addressed the merits of organic 
agriculture in similarly bleak terms: “[t]he greatest catastrophe that 
the human race could face this century is not global warming but a 
global conversion to ‘organic farming’—an estimated 2 billion people 
would perish.”73 
Yet what is interesting in the debate between conventional and 
nonconventional agriculture is how often one can see the influence of 
framing devices—rather than comprehensive risk-cost-benefit 
analyses—on the conclusions reached. To be sure, it is hardly clear 
that a full comparative analysis is desirable or even possible. In part, 
this is because such an analysis would implicate philosophical and 
political aspects of agriculture for which there are not agreed-upon 
goals or metrics such as the optimal socioeconomic structure of 
farming communities and the extent to which animal welfare should 
matter. Moreover, a full analysis even about such measurable outputs 
as long-term crop yield, effects on farm soils, energy use, and 
 
 71. See American Crop Protection Association comment on Docket No. TMD-00-02-PR2, 
RIN 0581-AA40, National Organic Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 65,890 (Dec. 16, 1997). 
 72. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on 
Agric., 94th Cong. 134 (1977) (statement of Arthur Bassett, Secretary, Onondaga County [New 
York] Pest Control Association); see also Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
Extension: Hearing on H.R. 8841 Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 94th Cong. 129 (1976) 
(remarks of Rep. Poage) (“Now if we are to go back to the ecology [without pesticides] as it 
existed when Columbus discovered this country, then everyone [sic] of us is going to starve in 3 
weeks.”). 
 73. Ronald Bailey, Organic Alchemy, REASONONLINE, June 5, 2002, http://www.reason. 
com/news/show/34820.html (quoting Cambridge University chemist John Emsley). 
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environmental externalities would be difficult in light of data that are 
incomplete, uncertain, and contested. 
But in this part of the Essay nothing as heroic as a full policy 
analysis of agricultural systems is necessary. Rather, to rebut the 
strident claims typically made against organic agriculture only two 
points need be made. First, claims against organic agriculture have in 
the past often relied on artificially constructed risk assessments that 
frame conventional agriculture in a manner that may not be justified 
on the merits. And second, once one begins to adjust the relevant 
frames of inquiry, organic agriculture can make a sufficient showing 
on the merits—akin to fulfilling a burden of coming forward—to 
warrant support as a policy matter and not simply as a marketing 
regime.  
A. Framing Risk Assessments of Synthetic Pesticides 
As a starting point, pesticides—and modern conventional 
agriculture generally—certainly deserve credit for improving 
agricultural output. Estimates of increased productivity indicate a 400 
percent rate of return in the aggregate on the pesticide dollar.74 Yet 
each particular type of pesticide carries within its application a form 
of self-limitation: the tendency of the pesticide to induce genetic 
resistance in future populations of the target pest and the destruction 
of beneficial organisms that had previously kept target populations in 
check.75 Thus, shortly before the OFPA was passed in the late 1980s 
the country lost roughly the same percentage of its crops to pests as it 
did in 1900, despite the application in 1987 of some 430 million 
pounds of pesticides.76 Although this does not mean that pesticides in 
the aggregate are not beneficial—as new pesticides are developed to 
counteract resistant pests—it also does not necessarily mean that 
pesticides are necessary. At the time of the OFPA’s passage, there 
 
 74. See David Pimentel et al., Benefits and Costs of Pesticide Use in U.S. Food Production, 
28 BIOSCI. 772, 781 (1978), cited in Hornstein, supra note 11, at 393. 
 75. Between 1938 and 1984, the number of pesticide-resistant insects and mites grew from 
seven species to four hundred and forty seven “and included most of the world’s pests.” Sandra 
Postel, Controlling Toxic Chemicals, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1988, at 22 (Linda Stark ed., 
1988) (citing George P. Georghiou, The Magnitude of the Resistance Problem, in NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDE RESISTANCE: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR MANAGEMENT 
(1986)). By 1999, almost 1,000 agricultural pests were immune to common pesticides. See 
LESTER R. BROWN ET AL., VITAL SIGNS 1999, at 124 (1999). 
 76. Postel, supra note 75, at 122 (“Insects and weeds now reduce crop production by about 
30 percent, apparently no less than before the chemical age dawned.”). 
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were data showing that pesticide use could be cut in half on some 
crops without significant reductions in yields or significant increases 
in price.77 Thus, in determining whether organic agriculture has 
something to offer as a public policy matter, one must credit 
conventional agricultural pesticides with benefits but perhaps not the 
extreme benefits often claimed by their most ardent defenders. 
This, then, puts the focus on pesticides’ risks and highlights the 
role that framing can have on our appreciation of these risks. Many of 
the debates over agriculture focus on the extent to which there are 
health risks to consumers from pesticide residues.78 And, although I 
discuss the effects of framing on this debate, it bears emphasis that 
the focus on health effects itself is not necessarily the dominant frame 
of reference by which the risks of pesticides (or the corresponding 
benefits or organic agriculture) ought to be resolved. Not only are 
many purchasers of organic products concerned about the adverse 
effects on the environment of conventional agriculture (as opposed to 
health effects),79 but the severe environmental effects of agriculture in 
general are increasingly drawing the attention of commenters.80 
 
 77. See JENNIFER CURTIS ET AL., HARVEST OF HOPE: THE POTENTIAL FOR 
ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE TO REDUCE PESTICIDE USE 4 (1991) (“A new study by Cornell 
University Entomologist, David Pimentel, estimates that if 50 percent of pesticides now used in 
American agriculture were replaced by nonchemical control techniques, crop yields would not 
decline and food prices would rise less than one percent.”) (citing David Pimentel et al., 
Environmental and Economic Impacts of Reducing U.S. Agricultural Pesticide Use, in 
HANDBOOK OF PEST MANAGEMENT IN AGRICULTURE (1991)); see also ALTERNATIVE 
AGRICULTURE, supra note 16, at 209–12 (the use of integrated pest management for insects on 
nine crops in ten states shows better yield for IPM users over nonusers). 
 78. See Barbara J. Goldman & Kathryn L. Clancy, A Survey of Organic Produce 
Purchasers and Related Attitudes of Food Cooperative Shoppers, 6 AM. J. ALTERNATIVE 
AGRIC. 89, 95 (1991) (measuring a high level of concern over pesticide residues on produce 
among those who seek out and purchase organic products), cited in Friedland, supra note 23, at 
410 n.154; see also Dennis T. Avery & Alex A. Avery, ‘Negative Campaigning’ for the New U.S. 
Organic Food Standards, Hudson Institute, Center for Global Food Issues, Oct. 2002, 
http://www.cgfi.org/materials/articles/2002/oct_18_02.htm (rebutting health claims made by 
advocates for organic food in part by noting that allowable pesticide residue amounts “are 
1/100th or 1/1000th of the ‘no-effect’ level in animal tests”); Richard A. Halpern, Dirty Pool, 
Hudson Institute, Center for Global Food Issues, Feb. 2000, http://www.cgfi.org/materials/ 
articles/2000/feb_23_00.htm (“Monsanto’s Roundup, for example, probably the most widely 
used herbicide in history, is half as toxic as table salt or Vitamin A and hundreds of times less 
toxic than caffeine.”). 
 79. See Friedland, supra note 23, at 407–08 (“Many consumers are motivated to buy 
organic food at least in part because they think organic farming is less harmful to the 
environment than conventional farming.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Agriculture and the Environment: Introduction to the 
Conference Issue, 25 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 47, 49 (2002) (“Disputes involving 
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Although organic agriculture can contribute to some environmental 
problems, its reduction in synthetic pesticide use can constitute an 
enormous public benefit.81 J.B. Ruhl documents the “undeniable” 
adverse environmental effects of pesticides82 on surface waters,83 
ground water,84 endangered species,85 and air pollution.86 Even in 1990, 
when the OFPA was enacted as a “marketing” program, EPA’s 
Science Advisory Board was elsewhere concluding that, “when 
compared with dozens of other risks, pesticides presented one of the 
country’s more widespread and severe environmental problems.”87 
Assuming the premise, however, that the risks of pesticides are 
to be measured principally by the health effects of pesticide residues 
on consumers, the conclusions reached can reflect the risk assessor’s 
frame of reference and not necessarily the underlying reality. This 
was perhaps best illustrated in the years following passage of the 
OFPA when evidence began to mount that pesticides may be more 
dangerous to infants and children than previously thought. In 1993, 
the National Academy of Sciences published the results of a five-year 
inquiry, Pesticides in the Diets of Infants and Children.88 Among its 
major findings were that risk assessments of pesticides were typically 
based only on the “average exposure of the entire population,”89 and 
 
agriculture and the environment have been frequent and varied over the last several years.”); 
J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 
269–70 (2000) (“But the reality is that farming, particularly in the modern American style, is an 
intensive land use involving a multitude of polluting and land transforming activities.”). 
 81. The NOP does allow certain nonsynthetic “natural” pesticides to be included on a 
“National List” of approved substances that can be used in organic food production (and in 
some instances even such non-organic substances as pectin and cornstarch). See RAWSON, supra 
note 48, at 3–4, 11. 
 82. Ruhl, supra note 80, at 282 (“Although pesticides have undoubtedly improved 
agricultural efficiency . . . their adverse environmental impacts are also undeniable.”). 
 83. Id. at 276–77, 283. 
 84. Id. at 283 n.107 (“In 1992, the EPA reported that 132 pesticide-related compounds, 117 
parent pesticides, and 16 pesticide degradates had been found in ground water in 42 states.”). 
 85. Id. at 277 & n.51; see also Hornstein, supra note 11, at 395 n.142 (“[A]dverse effects on 
wildlife have forced North Dakota to prohibit applications of 37 different kinds of pesticides 
under its endangered species program.”). 
 86. Ruhl, supra note 80, at 292 (“In California, two weeks of ambient air monitoring near 
sugar beet and potato fields for the carcinogen fumigant Telone II measured ambient air levels 
that exceeded the safe level for chronic inhalation exposures . . . .”). 
 87. See Hornstein, supra note 11, at 394 & n.130. 
 88. COMM. ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN (1993) [hereinafter INFANTS 
AND CHILDREN]. 
 89. Id. at 2. 
03__HORNSTEIN.DOC 7/20/2007  1:44 PM 
1558 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1541 
failed to recognize that infants and children had different (typically 
far higher) exposure levels and, as importantly, that pesticides can 
cause different (and sometimes more adverse) health effects in the 
developing body than they do in adults.90 Armed with these new 
insights, Congress passed the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 
(Food Protection Act)91 designed to establish administrative 
mechanisms that reevaluated the safety of pesticides specifically in 
light of the National Academy’s report.92 
To appreciate the battles over risk assessments that followed the 
Food Protection Act, it is helpful to understand the basic mechanisms 
by which EPA, prior to the Act, would determine the safety of 
pesticide residues on food. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA),93 EPA would establish “tolerances” for 
residues on raw agriculture commodities such as fresh produce under 
FFDCA section 408.94 Generally, these tolerances reflected a level of 
pesticide residue on food that EPA first determined to be 
“reasonably safe for an adult” often based on animal testing results 
and then, second, a discounting of this level by a factor of 100—a ten-
fold reduction to account for the uncertainties in scaling from animal 
tests to effects on humans and another ten-fold reduction to account 
for normal human variations in susceptibility to toxins.95 Prior to the 
Food Protection Act, however, EPA set tolerances “without regard to 
the special susceptibilities of children to pesticides.”96 Yet in its 1993 
Report, the National Academy of Sciences found that in their 
potential susceptibility to pesticides, “[p]rofound differences exist 
between children and adults” such that “the toxicity of pesticides is 
frequently different” between them.97 The Report suggested that, 
given the lack of basic data on “the effects of pesticide exposure on 
 
 90. Id. at 4–6 (exposure), 3 (age-related differences in children’s absorption, metabolism, 
detoxification, and excretion abilities as compared to adults). 
 91. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.). 
 92. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-669(II), at 43 (1990), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1268, 1282 
(House Commerce Committee’s Report on the Food Protection Act, citing the 1993 National 
Academy report). 
 93. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–393 (2000). 
 94. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 342, 346a(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 95. See Valerie Watnick, Risk Assessment: Obfuscation of Policy Decisions in Pesticide 
Regulation and the EPA’s Dismantling of the Food Quality Protection Act’s Safeguards for 
Children, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1315, 1318–19 (1999). 
 96. Id. at 1318. 
 97. INFANTS AND CHILDREN, supra note 88, at 3. 
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neurotoxic, immunotoxic, [and] endocrine responses in infants and 
children,”98 and that when toxicity testing in relation to children 
reveals certain fetal development effects or testing in relation to post-
fetal development is “incomplete,” an additional ten-fold reduction in 
pesticide tolerances should be used.99 
The Food Protection Act codified many of the National 
Academy’s recommendations. In particular, it required EPA to set 
tolerances that considered the special susceptibility of infants and 
children to pesticides; that considered the higher levels of 
consumption by children of fruits, vegetables and other products; that 
accounted for the “cumulative” effects of exposures to other 
chemicals (pesticides or not) that shared a common mechanism of 
toxicity with the suspect pesticide; and that considered the 
“aggregate” amount of the pesticide to which an individual might also 
be exposed (such as amounts of the same pesticide that might be 
found in tapwater or that might be found in household and garden 
products).100 The Act specifically directed EPA to apply an additional 
“tenfold margin of safety” to account for the special susceptibility of 
infants and children, allowing the use of a different margin of safety 
“only if, on the basis of reliable data, such margin will be safe for 
infants and children.”101 At bottom, EPA was to readjust its approach 
to pesticides and to issue tolerances for new pesticides, as well as to 
reanalyze tolerances for all existing pesticides, such that “there is a 
reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure 
to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary 
exposures and all other exposures for which there is reliable 
information.”102 To help with the enormous scientific task with which 
EPA had been charged—reassessing over 9,000 then-existing 
tolerances—the Act allowed EPA to approach the problem in stages: 
to reassess one-third of these tolerances by August 1999, the next 
third by August 2002, and the final third by August 2006.103 
 
 98. Id. at 4. 
 99. Id. at 9. 
 100. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C), (D) (2000). See generally Thomas O. McGarity, 
Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s Implementation of the Food Quality 
Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 118–19 (2001) (elaborating on the statutory 
requirements). 
 101. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C) (2000); see also McGarity, supra note 100, at 118. 
 102. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). 
 103. See CONSUMERS UNION OF THE U.S., A REPORT CARD FOR THE EPA: SUCCESSES 
AND FAILURES IN IMPLEMENTING THE FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT, Overview, at 2 
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It is precisely from these new, science-based reference points 
required by the Food Protection Act that one can begin to appreciate 
why organic agriculture may offer health-based, and not simply 
“market-based,” benefits. Several years after the Act’s passage, and 
after EPA had completed its reassessment of the first third of 
tolerances, both the U.S. General Accounting Office104 and the 
Consumers Union of the United States105 reported on EPA’s new-
found conclusions regarding pesticide safety. Both reports noted that 
EPA had targeted especially the classes of organophosphate and 
carbamate insecticides because they were widely used on fruits and 
vegetables consumed by children106 and because they operated as 
neurotoxins to which infants and children with developing nervous 
systems might be especially vulnerable.107 Of 44 organophosphates 
registered for use in the United States, EPA tightened the chronic 
exposure limit in 20 cases, or 45 percent.108 For most of these 
pesticides, moreover, it was expected that further data on aggregate 
and cumulative exposure might cause even further tolerance 
reductions.109 After considering in June 2000 just such additional data 
on chlorpyrifos, the most widely used household insecticide in the 
United States, EPA announced “a need to substantially reduce 
 
(2001), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/fqpa/ReportCard_final.pdf [hereinafter 
CONSUMERS UNION REPORT]. 
 104. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILDREN AND PESTICIDES: NEW APPROACH TO 
CONSIDERING RISK IS PARTLY IN PLACE (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/ 
2000/he00175.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 105. See CONSUMERS UNION REPORT, supra note 103. 
 106. See, e.g., id., pt. 2, at 2 (“Early in its FQPA implementation planning, EPA determined 
that the organophosphate (OP) and carbamate insecticides (two families of acutely neurotoxic 
chemicals, many of which are widely used on fruits and vegetables popular in children’s diets) 
should be top priorities.”); GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 8 (“EPA has identified the 
organophosphates as a class of pesticides requiring cumulative assessment because they can 
impair nervous system function by inhibiting the enzyme cholinesterase.”). 
 107. See GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 8; CONSUMERS UNION REPORT, supra note 103, 
pt. 3, at 1. 
 108. See CONSUMERS UNION REPORT, supra note 103, pt. 2, at 4–5. EPA’s conclusions as to 
these pesticides’ risks were interim in nature because cumulative data on exposure to this 
chemical class were not considered in this first wave, and they were expected to become even 
more unforgiving when cumulative data became available. See GAO REPORT, supra note 104, 
at 4 (“EPA has not completed aggregate exposure reviews for all 39 organophosphates 
individually, but when it does, a cumulative assessment will be required for the group, which 
may identify the need for additional changes.”). 
 109. See CONSUMERS UNION REPORT, supra note 103, pt. 2, at 4. 
03__HORNSTEIN.DOC 7/20/2007  1:44 PM 
2007] ORGANIC AGRICULTURE 1561 
children’s exposure to this pesticide by reducing its use on foods 
frequently eaten by children . . . .”110 
The contrast between this reassessment of pesticide safety, on 
the one hand, and implementation of the Organic Food Production 
Act, on the other, is striking. Just as reports on EPA’s first wave of 
reanalyses of pesticide tolerances were being reported, the USDA 
was announcing and implementing the “organic” label provisions of 
the National Organic Act.111 Whatever would emerge as the final 
picture of pesticides’ dangers to children and infants, there are data 
indicating that eating organic foods reduces those risks. In 2001, in a 
study reported in Environmental Health Perspectives (the journal of 
the National Institute of Environmental Health Science), a survey of 
pesticide exposure among 110 urban and suburban children in the 
Seattle area found what was then considered a surprising result—
measurable levels of organophosphate pesticide metabolites were 
found in the urine of all children, “except for one child, whose parents 
reported buying exclusively organic produce.”112 To confirm the 
implications of this result, a more comprehensive study among young 
children in the Seattle area was conducted, complete with a carefully 
designed control group, which reached similar results: “eating organic 
produce can markedly lower children’s exposures (to 
organophosphates) from possibly above the EPA’s current safety 
 
 110. GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 4. To be sure, EPA did not tighten the limits for most 
of the tolerances considered in this first wave of reassessment. EPA eliminated or cancelled 
nearly half of the 3,471 tolerances “counted as reassessed” in the first wave without even 
considering the new children-centered risk assessments in the Food Protection Act. Id. at 19. 
Some of these voluntary cancellations reflected manufacturers simply agreeing to eliminate 
tolerances for products that had been withdrawn from various uses in the past. Id. In other 
cases, manufacturers claimed that they were agreeing to withdrawal of tolerances due to 
“market conditions.” Id. As to this latter group, however, the GAO reported that “[a]n EPA 
official told us that in a number of these cases, risk concerns that the agency expressed about the 
associated pesticide contributed to the manufacturer’s decision to drop the tolerance.” Id. As to 
those pesticides that did consider the new regulatory requirements of the Food Protection Act, 
most of those tolerances, 77.5 percent, resulted in no change. Id. However, as I note infra in the 
text accompanying notes 115–25, some of these decisions generated considerable controversy. 
 111. See National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at 7 
C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 112. ORGANIC CTR., SUCCESSES AND LOST OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE CHILDREN’S 
EXPOSURE TO PESTICIDES SINCE THE MID-1990S, at 6 (2006) [hereinafter ORGANIC CTR.] 
(referencing Chensheng Lu et al., Biological Monitoring Survey of Organophosphate Pesticide 
Exposure among Preschool Children in the Seattle Metropolitan Area, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSPECT. 299–303 (2001)). 
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guidelines, to negligible risk levels.”113 Even more recently, a third 
study, and the first to introduce longitudinal analysis, found that 
children switching from conventional to organic diets saw two 
organophosphate pesticide concentrations drop to nondetectable 
levels until the reintroduction of a diet using food grown 
conventionally.114 Although the quantifiable health benefits of eating 
organic produce would depend on many factors, including any 
negative factors stemming from the higher price of organic food, for 
the purposes of this analysis a final accounting need not be made. All 
that is necessary is that health benefits are not improbable. And 
further insights from EPA’s implementation of the Food Protection 
Act only contribute to that conclusion. 
B. Organic Agriculture as Insurance Against Politicized Agency 
Decisions 
It is possible that EPA’s reassessment of pesticide risks, despite 
the Agency’s early warnings on organophosphates, was actually even 
more generous toward pesticides than was—and may still be—
justified by the available science. One reason for this may be the 
political pressure exerted on EPA. To the extent this is true, then 
purchasers of organic food are in fact making a second type of 
purchase. The premium they pay in price also includes a type of 
insurance payment made against the prospect that food grown 
conventionally contains risks that, for political reasons, escape EPA 
action. 
Evidence of political pressure on EPA became evident as EPA 
went about implementing the Food Protection Act. The scientific 
flashpoint involved Congress’s specific concern, drawn from the 
National Academy report on infants and children, that pesticides 
could present special neurological and developmental risks to 
growing fetuses and children.115 The legal flashpoint was caught in 
Congress’s decision to require EPA to apply an extra ten-fold margin 
of safety to a pesticide’s tolerance (the 10-X factor) unless “on the 
 
 113. Id. at 6 (referencing Cynthia L. Curl et al., Organophosphorous Pesticide Exposure of 
Urban and Suburban Preschool Children with Organic and Conventional Diets, 111 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSPECT. 377 (2003)). 
 114. See Chensheng Lu et al., Organic Diets Significantly Lower Children’s Dietary 
Exposure to Organophosphorous Pesticides, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECT. 260, 260–63 
(2006). 
 115. See supra text accompanying note 101. 
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basis of reliable data” a different margin of safety would lead, after 
consideration of “all anticipated dietary exposures and all other 
exposures for which there is reliable information,” to the conclusion 
of “reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate 
exposure.”116 And the regulatory flashpoints were EPA’s decisions on 
the types of neurological/developmental data to require and on the 
type of data gap that would justify a departure from the default 10-X 
factor. 
In 1998, as the Agency was developing policies on reassessing the 
first third of tolerances, a political firefight erupted over application 
of the 10-X factor. A memorandum from EPA Administrator Carol 
Browner on February 25 suggested one of the Agency’s judgments on 
how to proceed: “[w]here there is uncertainty about the need for 
additional studies to address child-specific concerns, then that 
uncertainty itself should mandate application of an additional safety 
factor.”117 Almost immediately, a representative of the American 
Crop Protection Association (ACPA) complained publicly that 
Browner’s position represented “political mischief”118 that abandoned 
“sound science”119 and that “could result in the loss of 90 percent of 
organophosphate uses allowed on food.”120 Within the ensuing weeks, 
then-Vice President Al Gore issued a directive to EPA to “follow 
congressional intent in applying extra protection for children,” but to 
apply “sound science,” and to create an administrative process that 
would allow “interested parties” to provide feedback on agency 
implementation.121 Thereafter, a lobbying effort to “bring reason” to 
EPA’s implementation of the Food Protection Act was announced by 
the ACPA that sought to generate five million “postcards or letters 
sent to the president, members of Congress, and senior [EPA] 
officials.”122 Spokesmen for the ACPA and for a large pesticide 
registrant emphasized, respectively, that “science should drive public 
 
 116. See supra text accompanying note 102. 
 117. Bert McMeen, Pesticides: Agency Stance on Children’s Protections under FQPA 
Criticized by Industry Official, DAILY ENVT. REP. (BNA), Mar. 4, 1998. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Bert McMeen, Pesticides: Advisory Group Planned on FQPA in Response to 
Directive from Gore, DAILY ENVT. REP. (BNA), Apr. 13, 1998. 
 122. See APCA Launches Letter-Writing Campaign Urging Rational Implementation of 
FQPA, DAILY ENVT. REP. (BNA), Apr. 24, 1998. 
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policy,”123 and that missteps by EPA could result in “decreased food 
quality and increased numbers of insect parts in food [and] rises in 
insect-borne diseases, such as encephalitis and lyme disease.”124 By the 
end of April 1998, a staff member of a House Agriculture 
Subcommittee was quoted as saying that hearings would soon be 
scheduled “that could lead to legislative changes if EPA does not 
change direction in the way it is implementing the law”; the staff 
member specifically emphasized the Subcommittee’s concern “that 
EPA is planning to use default assumptions in reassessments of 
organophosphates and a related insecticide class, carbamates, under 
[the Food Protection Act].”125 
Although EPA in some ways resisted the political pressure under 
which it was operating, in other ways the health-protective promises 
of the Food Protection Act never escaped the gravitational forces 
brought to bear by the pesticide industry and its political allies. In 
1999, on the eve of EPA’s deadline covering the first third of 
tolerance reassessments, EPA announced a ban on 36 uses of methyl 
parathion, a major organophosphate pesticide, including its use on 
peaches, apples, pears, and grapes that were of special importance in 
the diets of infants and children.126 And, as mentioned above, EPA 
tightened tolerances on almost two dozen other organophosphates, 
including especially chlorpyrifos, shortly thereafter.127 But in these 
early decisions it was also evident that EPA was most likely to act 
only when it had specific affirmative data suggesting an increased risk 
to children—that is, “good science” showing that children faced a 
danger—rather than to apply the precautionary 10-X factor whenever 
 
 123. Bert McMeen, Environmental Groups Say Panel Could Stall Law’s Implementation, 22 
CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 147 (Apr. 17, 1998) (quoting Chrisopher Klose, a spokesman for the 
American Crop Protection Association, regarding “concerns of growers, pesticide applicators 
and producers, and others that science should drive public policy”). 
 124. See Bert McMeen, Pesticides: Results of “Rigid” EPA Policies Under FQPA Could Be 
Devastating, Industry Official Says, DAILY ENVT. REP. (BNA), Apr. 24, 1998 (quoting Elin 
Miller, global director for government and public affairs at Dow Agrosciences, Inc.). 
 125. See Bert McMeen, Pesticides: EPA’s Implementation of FQPA Could Result in Changes 
to 1996 Law, House Staffer Says, DAILY ENVT. REP. (BNA), Apr. 28, 1998 (claiming also that 
“[l]awmakers on three congressional committees, including the House and Senate agriculture 
committees, have warned EPA to use reliable data on exposure rather than default 
assumptions, and to use ‘sound science’ and consult with interested parties, before making 
decisions on allowable uses of pesticides”). 
 126. See CONSUMERS UNION REPORT, supra note 103, pt. 3, at 4. 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 104–10. The Consumers Union, however, noted that 
EPA could have been much more aggressive in making even further restrictions on chlorpyrifos. 
See CONSUMERS UNION REPORT, supra note 103, pt. 3, at 6. 
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the evidence was incomplete. In its report to Congress in 2000, the 
GAO found that EPA was most likely to use a 10-X safety factor 
when it “identified both toxicology data gaps and evidence of 
increased susceptibility in children.”128 When the scientific record was 
incomplete, but the incomplete data did not contain any affirmative 
evidence of harm, a safety factor “less than” 10-X was recommended, 
often a three-fold factor (3-X).129 Apart from the (in)consistency of 
this practice with the 10-X provisions of the Food Protection Act 
itself, it is hardly clear that the practice represented “good science.” 
In 2002, a majority of EPA’s Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) who 
addressed the 10-X issue “disagreed” with the Agency’s “selective 
application of a 3X safety factor” and concluded that the “available 
data was not sufficient to assure adequate protection with less than 
the 10X FQPA safety factor.”130 
But the long-term problem with the Agency’s decision not to 
apply the 10-X margin of safety strictly was that it removed an 
underlying incentive for pesticide manufacturers to develop the full 
set of test data that might prove that lower tolerances were justified—
the very sort of empirically grounded “good science” ostensibly being 
demanded. Even worse, in the absence of a 10-X factor, the industry 
and its political allies actually had more maneuvering room from 
which they could resist calls to produce that data. The prospect of just 
such a possibility unfolded over developmental neurotoxicity tests 
(DNTs). DNTs can shed light especially on those pesticides (such as 
many organophosphates) that are designed to inhibit cholinesterase, 
an enzyme “needed for the proper functioning of the nervous systems 
of both humans and animals,” which presented special risks to 
younger animals whose developing bodies were often less able to 
detoxify them.131 In 2005, EPA’s Office of Research and Development 
(ORD), which is described by the Agency as its office with special 
 
 128. GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 12 (emphasis added). 
 129. See id. at 12–13. 
 130. Kristina Thayer & Jane Houlihan, Pesticides, Human Health, and the Food Quality 
Protection Act, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 295–96 (2004) (citing FIFRA 
SCI. ADVISORY PANEL, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TRANSMITTAL OF MEETING MINUTES OF THE 
FIFRA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL MEETING HELD JUNE 26–27, 2002, at 10 (2002)). Some 
SAP members did accept EPA’s use of the 3-X factor, albeit “with certain reservations.” Id. at 
296. 
 131. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION REPORT: 
OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE DATA QUALITY AND CHILDREN’S HEALTH THROUGH THE 
FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT 8–9 (2006) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT I]. 
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responsibility for “sound science,”132 “strongly recommended” that 
EPA “require a developmental neurotoxicity study for pesticide 
registration.”133 But in January 2006, EPA’s Office of Inspector 
General reported that “[i]ndustry representatives have said that 
developmental neurotoxicity study results are difficult to interpret 
and expensive to conduct.”134 Although the Agency originally 
proposed regulations that would nonetheless have implemented 
ORD’s recommendation for required DNTs,135 the Inspector General 
reported that EPA retreated from this position after the White 
House’s Office of Management and Budget “expressed its concerns 
on the increasing amount of resources devoted to pesticide 
registration and the amount of data required to support a new 
registration”136—concerns that the trade press described as “echo[ing] 
those expressed by the pesticide industry.”137 
In August 2006, EPA’s Office of Inspector General issued its 
final report on the Agency’s ten-year implementation of the Food 
Protection Act.138 The results were mixed. On the one hand, the 
Report concluded that EPA’s actions had a measurable and positive 
impact especially on the dietary risk from pesticide residues faced by 
 
 132. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, About EPA Research & Development, http://www.epa.gov/ 
ord/htm/aboutord.htm (last visited May 11, 2007) (“The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) relies on sound science . . . . The Office of Research and Development (ORD) is the 
scientific research arm of EPA. ORD’s leading-edge research helps provide the solid 
underpinning of science . . . for the Agency.”). 
 133. See INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT I, supra note 131, at 9 (emphasis added) (citing 
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BRIEFING BOOK AND POSTER 
ABSTRACT PROVIDED TO THE BOARD OF SCIENTIFIC COUNSELORS FOR REVIEW OF ORD’S 
HUMAN HEALTH RESEARCH PROGRAM ON FEB. 28, 2005, TO MAR. 2, 2005). At the time of 
ORD’s recommendation, EPA only “conditionally required” DNTs, typically only when other 
tests “indicate[d] the potential for adverse functional developmental effects.” See McGarity, 
supra note 100, at 142–43. As EPA’s required developmental toxicity tests did not require 
information about “functional deficits,” EPA as of mid-1998 had received DNTs for only six 
pesticides. Id. at 143. 
 134. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT I, supra note 131, at 9. 
 135. See id. at 12 (“EPA proposed adding new requirements for developmental 
neurotoxicity test data to the toxicity testing battery as part of the chemical registration 
process.”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Dean Scott, Pesticides: EPA Should Weigh Cost-Effective Measures As It Revises 
Chemical Data Rule, OMB Says, CHEM. REG. DAILY (Apr. 6, 2005) (“OMB’s cost concerns, 
which echo those expressed by the pesticide industry, probably will get close examination by the 
agency given OMB’s role in ultimately clearing any final version of the Part 158 revisions.”). 
 138. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION REPORT: 
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF THE FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES (2006) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT II]. 
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pesticides,146 and had not yet determined whether there would need to 
be additional cumulative analyses done involving multiple chemical 
families of pesticides that share “common mode[s] of action.”147 As 
EPA approached the Food Protection Act’s August 2006 deadline, 
three public-employee labor unions claimed that “[i]n the rush to 
meet the August 2006 FQPA statutory deadline, many steps in the 
risk assessment and risk management process are being abbreviated 
or eliminated in violation of the principles of scientific integrity and 
objectivity by which we as public servants are bound.”148 
The plausibility of considering organic agriculture as a type of 
insurance against regulatory slippage is only reinforced when one 
considers the prospects of future political or special-interest 
distortions in the regulation of conventional pesticides. After EPA 
was well underway in its implementation of the Food Protection Act, 
Congress changed the general regulatory landscape by enacting in 
2000 the Data Quality Act (DQA).149 The DQA was a single-
paragraph rider to a massive appropriations bill enacted “without any 
hearings or extensive legislative history.”150 Yet it required, among 
other things, that regulatory agencies create administrative 
mechanisms by which “affected persons” could “seek and obtain 
correction of information” that is alleged not to comply with various 
data quality–related “guidelines.”151 William Kovacs, a vice president 
 
 146. Id. at 31 (noting that, although the cumulative risk assessment on the carbamates was 
“nearly complete,” by August 2006 “EPA [had] completed a cumulative risk assessment . . . on 
just one family of chemistry—the [organophosphates]”). 
 147. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 100 (presenting the statutory requirement 
regarding pesticides that share a “common mechanism of toxicity”). 
 148. Pesticides: Employees’ Unions Ask EPA to Regulate Organophosphates, Carbamates 
Strictly, CHEM. REG. DAILY (May 26, 2006). More modestly, the EPA Inspector General 
concluded in August 2006 that, despite evidence of some public-health gains made under the 
statute, the Agency could not connect its actions with the broader, bottom-line question 
regarding the risk of food grown by conventional agricultural inputs: “Because it lacks measures 
on the impact of actions on the health of infants, children, and the overall human population, 
[EPA] cannot state the impact of its . . . efforts [under the Food Protection Act].” INSPECTOR 
GENERAL REPORT II, supra note 138, at 5. 
 149. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 
2763, 2763A-153 to -154 (2000). 
 150. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., Ensuring the Quality of Data Disseminated by the Federal 
Government: Workshop #1, at 9 (Mar. 11, 2002) (statement of Dr. John Graham, the OMB 
official later appointed to be in charge of administering the DQA); see also id. at 32 (statement 
of Alan Morrison, Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford Law School) (“The Data Quality Act is a 
statute that is quite short . . . . It is only a couple of paragraphs, and the good news and the bad 
news about the legislative history is the same news. There isn’t any.”). 
 151. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. at 2763A-154. 
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of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, might only have slightly 
exaggerated when he claimed in 2002 that the DQA “will have the 
most profound impact on federal regulations since the Administrative 
Procedure Act was enacted in 1946 . . . by ensuring that [the 
Environmental Protection Agency] uses better science, and by giving 
industry additional grounds to sue.”152 
The direct ramifications of the DQA for EPA’s pesticide 
programs soon became evident. The pesticide industry had 
successfully pressured EPA in the name of “good science” into 
abandoning blanket application of the precautionary 10-X factor and 
then resisted EPA’s attempts to require unconditionally the DNT 
tests that EPA scientists had recommended. The combined effect of 
these two campaigns meant that EPA would become more dependent 
on information produced by third parties (especially academic 
researchers) about pesticides’ safety—and the DQA gave the 
pesticide industry a newfound leverage point to “seek and obtain 
correction of” scientific evidence with which they disagreed. The 
opportunity arose over atrazine, one of the most widely used 
herbicides in the country.153 Atrazine was already a suspect chemical 
under the Food Protection Act. EPA’s Safety Factor Committee, in a 
November 2000 report, recommended that the Act’s full 10-X safety 
factor be used in assessing atrazine’s risks,154 in part because studies at 
EPA’s National Health and Environmental Effects Laboratory had 
found evidence that atrazine can cause neuroendocrine alterations in 
animals’ development, such as disruption of “critical reproductive 
processes including puberty.”155 This was of special concern to 
atrazine’s manufacturer, Syngenta, which persuaded EPA in January 
2003 to relax atrazine’s safety factor to 3-X on the basis of new 
exposure data.156 
 
 152. OMB Guidelines on Quality of Information Seen As Having Profound Impact on 
Agencies, 33 ENVT. REP. (BNA) 146 (Jan. 18, 2002), cited in Donald T. Hornstein, Accounting 
for Science: The Independence of Public Research in the New, Subterranean Administrative Law, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 228 (Autumn 2003). 
 153. See Goldie Blumenstyk, The Story of Syngenta and Tyrone Hayes at UC Berkeley: The 
Price of Research, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 31, 2003, at A26. 
 154. See Memorandum from Brenda Tarplee, Executive Secretary, FQPA Safety Factor 
Committee to Catherine Eiden, Risk Assessor, Reregistration Branch 3, at 1 (Nov. 14, 2000) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal) (“The [Safety Factor Committee] concluded that the FQPA 
safety factor should be retained at 10x when assessing parent atrazine and its chloro-
metabolites . . . .”). 
 155. Id. at 5. 
 156. See Thayer & Houlihan, supra note 130, at 311 tbl.6, 312 n.266. 
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The possibility of endocrine-disruption effects of atrazine 
became highlighted between 2000 and 2003. In part, this was because 
the Food Protection Act had required EPA to develop a special 
screening program specifically to test for pesticides’ estrogenic and 
other endocrine-related effects, a program which the Agency had not 
yet implemented.157 But in larger part, it was because a former 
Syngenta consultant, Dr. Tyrone Hayes of the University of 
California at Berkeley, had published a widely noted article in April 
2002 in a prestigious peer-reviewed journal finding that atrazine, at 
levels a fraction of those allowed under federal drinking-water 
regulations, triggered the production of estrogen in the sex organs of 
male frogs, causing them to grow ovaries and eggs.158 
Contemporaneously, an EPA risk assessment on atrazine identified 
the potential endocrine-related effects of atrazine as “an endpoint 
that warrants additional study.” By summer 2002, EPA faced a 
petition to withdraw atrazine from the market, citing Hayes’s 
published work.159 
Enter the DQA. In November 2002, EPA received a “Request 
for Correction” under the Data Quality Act regarding its risk 
assessment of atrazine, filed by the Kansas Corn Growers Association 
and the Triazine Network, two organizations representing growers 
who used atrazine.160 The Request was joined by the Center for 
Regulatory Effectiveness (CRE), an industrial lobbying group, and 
written by CRE’s founder, Jim Tozzi,161 who has repeatedly been 
credited with having drafted the DQA itself.162 The Request vilified 
 
 157. Id. at 284 (“FQPA mandates that EPA develop a program to test for endocrine 
disrupting effects . . . . to be implemented by 1999. EPA, however, is still years away from 
implementing an endocrine screening and testing program.”). 
 158. See Blumenstyk, supra note 153 (referring to Hayes’s first article appearing in the April 
2002 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences and, two months later, being referenced 
in a petition by the Natural Resources Defense Council to EPA to withdraw atrazine from the 
market). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Ctr. for Regulatory Effectiveness, Data Quality Act Request for Correction, Nov. 
25, 2002 [hereinafter Request for Correction] (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (stating that 
“EPA’s statements in the atrazine Environmental Risk Assessment regarding atrazine’s 
purported endocrine effects violate government wide data quality standards”) (italics omitted). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Alexander Nathan Hecht, Administrative Process in an Information Age: The 
Transformation of Agency Action Under the Data Quality Act, 31 J. LEGIS. 233, 259 (2005) 
(“The DQA is commonly regarded as the brainchild of Jim Tozzi, an industry lobbyist with the 
Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, a pro-business think-tank located in Washington, D.C.”); 
Michelle V. Lacko, The Data Quality Act: Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy?, 53 EMORY L.J. 
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EPA for “bad science” for merely having referenced Hayes’s study,163 
even though EPA had referred only to Dr. Hayes’s findings as 
hypotheses and had only mildly credited those findings as warranting 
“additional testing with atrazine-treated tadpoles and adult frogs . . . 
to determine what, if any, effects occur on reproduction.”164 The 
Request demanded that the risk assessment be reissued to “state that 
there is no reliable evidence that atrazine causes endocrine effects in 
the environment.”165 
In January 2003, the Agency conceded to the Requesters just 
enough for them to proclaim victory. To the Agency’s credit, the 
Agency refused to “reissue” its risk assessment, as the Requesters 
had demanded, to state affirmatively that there was “no reliable 
evidence” that atrazine causes environmental endocrine effects.166 On 
the other hand, EPA promised that it would be “clarifying” its risk 
assessment “to avoid any future misunderstanding of the Agency’s 
 
305, 307 (2004) (“Jim Tozzi, head of the corporate-sponsored Center for Regulatory 
Effectiveness (CRE) has boldly taken credit for the development and implementation of the 
DQA.”); id. at 307 n.14 (“Jim Tozzi . . . persuaded Representative Jo Ann Emerson to quietly 
insert the Act into [Pub. L. No. 106-554] . . . .”); Wendy E. Wagner, Science in the Regulatory 
Process: The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role of Science in Public 
Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 n.24 (Autumn 2003) 
(“It also appears from the oral history that it was an industrial lobbyist and not a congressional 
staffer that drafted and guided the rider through Congress.”); James T. O’Reilly, The 411 on 
515: How OIRA’s Expanded Information Roles in 2002 Will Impact Rule-Making and Agency 
Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 840 n.20 (2002) (“Discussion at the American Bar 
Association Fall Administrative Law Conference dinner . . . honoring past directors of the 
OIRA, suggested that Jim Tozzi, former OIRA director, had been the principal drafter of the 
515 language . . . .”). 
 163. See Request for Correction, supra note 160, at 3 (“This sub-section of the risk 
assessment first describes, without criticism, atrazine tests perform by Dr. Tyrone Hayes on 
frogs.”), 8 (“The Triazine Network’s goal is to ensure an outcome to EPA’s atrazine review 
based on sound science. The Environmental Risk Assessment’s statements regarding atrazine’s 
endocrine effects adversely affect this goal because they are not based on sound science.”); see 
also id. (“EPA’s Environmental Risk Assessment’s statements regarding atrazine’s endocrine 
effects fuel and encourage public misperceptions regarding atrazine . . . [and] must be corrected 
now in order to stop this flood of misinformation and bad science.”). 
 164. Id. at 3 (citing selected portions of EPA’s risk assessment and concluding, “[t]hus, 
EPA’s Environmental Risk Assessment accepts the endocrine effects allegedly shown by the 
Hayes Frog Tests as accurate and reliable . . . [and] the only remaining question is whether those 
endocrine effects affect frogs’ ability to reproduce”). 
 165. Id. at 1. 
 166. See Letter from Marcia E. Mulkey, Director, Office of Pesticide Programs to Jere 
White, Executive Director, Kansas Corn Growers Association (Jan. 30, 2003) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (“We believe that it would be inappropriate to amend the Environmental 
Risk Assessment for atrazine as you suggested because it is premature to conclude that there is 
no reliable evidence that atrazine causes ‘endocrine effects’ in the environment.”). 
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position on the environmental effects of atrazine.”167 In March 2003, 
the Agency reiterated that it could not state that “there is no reliable 
evidence that atrazine causes endocrine effects in the environment” 
but nonetheless revised the risk assessment so that it “does not 
suggest that endocrine disruption, or potential effects on endocrine-
mediated pathways, be regarded as a legitimate regulatory endpoint 
at this time.”168 Although the Agency subsequently summarized its 
actions as reflecting only “minor editorial changes,”169 the Requesters 
thereafter crowed that “EPA in large part agreed with CRE’s Data 
Quality Act Petition . . . .”170 And it is hard not to agree that the 
Requesters’ DQA petition had a significant effect. In June 2003, 
EPA’s Scientific Advisory Panel met specifically to evaluate the data 
on atrazine’s potential developmental effects on amphibians. 
Although the SAP found that Hayes’s and other experimenters’ data 
presented various procedural inconsistencies and uncertainties as to 
the underlying hypothesis, all of the SAP panel members “agreed that 
sufficient data existed to warrant concern.”171 Thus, precisely when 
the data were incomplete and the Food Protection Act might be 
thought to encourage the Agency to consider further precautionary 
margins of safety over and above those already in place, the DQA 
petition on atrazine resulted in the Agency delaying this possibility as 
a regulatory “endpoint.” At the very least, the DQA bought 
atrazine’s producers and users more time. The SAP is scheduled to 
reconsider atrazine’s environmental effects on amphibians in October 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Response to Comments from Syngenta and Its Contractors 
18–19 (Mar. 26, 2003), http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/ 
2807Response_03_27_03.pdf (emphasis added). 
 169. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INFORMATION QUALITY FY03 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2004), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/EPA_IQG_FY03_ 
Annual_Report.pdf. 
 170. Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Comments by the Center for Regulatory 
Effectiveness on Docket OPP-2003-0024, at 2, http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20030811_frogsap.pdf. 
 171. See FIFRA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL (SAP) REPORT, POTENTIAL 
DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS OF ATRAZINE ON AMPHIBIANS (Aug. 4, 2003), at 17–18, 
http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/meetings/2003/june/junemeetingreport.pdf (“The Panel 
concurred with the Agency’s determination that the laboratory studies on the effects of atrazine 
on anuran gonadal development are sufficient to hypothesize that atrazine interferes with 
normal development . . . [f]ive studies detected abnormalities of gonadal development . . . [and] 
[t]he inability to detect gonadal development [in two unpublished studies] should not detract 
from the positive results noted in the majority of the studies.”). 
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2007;172 meanwhile, the Bush Administration’s requested 2008 budget 
includes reductions in EPA’s chemical-screening projects, with its 
“endocrine disruptors program” taking “the largest hit.”173 
The point of the atrazine episode, of course, is not to claim that 
consumers of organic agriculture avoid a risk that can be, at this time, 
precisely quantified. Rather, it is to underscore the plausibility that 
the premium paid for organic food is rationally related to the danger 
that regulatory decisions on conventional agriculture, ostensibly 
grounded in “good science,” in fact reflect political- and special-
interest pressures. Indeed, the special dangers of the Data Quality 
Act continue to unfold. In January 2006, the White House Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) cited the DQA as its principal 
statutory authority for a proposed “Risk Assessment Bulletin” that 
would regularize risk assessments across the federal government.174 
Immediately upon its publication, the proposed Bulletin was referred 
for scientific review to a panel of the National Academy of Sciences.175 
To be sure, it was unclear from the outset whether the Bulletin would 
affect EPA’s regulation of pesticides: the proposed bulletin exempted 
risk assessments for individual permitting and licensing decisions,176 
which seemed to exclude individual pesticide registrations and re-
registrations, but expressly was meant to apply to “risk assessments 
performed with respect to classes of products,”177 which EPA 
understood to cover tolerance-setting under the Food Protection 
 
 172. See Pesticides: EPA to Discuss Atrazine Studies with Panel, Asks for Submission of 
Additional Studies, CHEM. REG. DAILY (Apr. 5, 2007). 
 173. See Pat Phibbs-Rizzuto, Budget: EPA Endocrine Disruption Work Targeted for 
Funding Cut in FY 2008 Budget Proposal, CHEM. REG. DAILY (Feb. 8, 2007) (“The endocrine 
program also would lose three full-time staff members” and “may postpone the validation of 
mammal assays, interlaboratory trials, and initial screening of the first set of potential 
endocrine-disrupting chemicals . . . .”). 
 174. Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin, 71 Fed. Reg. 2,600 (proposed Jan. 17, 2006). OMB 
lists the “Information Quality Act” as the first of the statutory authorities claimed to support 
the proposed Bulletin. OMB BULLETIN, supra note 32, at 7. 
 175. Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin, 71 Fed. Reg. at 2,600 (stating in the announcement 
of the proposed Bulletin that OMB “has referred [it] to the National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS), for their expert review”). 
 176. OMB BULLETIN, supra note 32, at 10 (“This Bulletin does not apply to risk assessments 
that arise in the course of individual agency adjudications or permit proceedings, unless the 
agency determines that: (1) compliance with the Bulletin is practical and appropriate and (2) the 
risk assessment is scientifically or technically novel or likely to have precedent-setting influence 
on future adjudications and/or permit proceedings.”). 
 177. Id. 
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Act.178 To the extent this was true, OMB’s proposed risk assessment 
standards would have undermined, in the name of data “quality,” the 
very value judgments Congress had written into the Act. In early 
2007, the NAS scientific review panel issued its report.179 Generally, 
the NAS panel concluded that as a scientific matter the OMB 
Bulletin was “fundamentally flawed,” possessed “the potential for 
negative impacts on the practice of risk assessment in the federal 
government,” and “could not be rescued.”180 Specifically, among its 
findings that could have affected the safety of conventional 
agriculture, the NAS panel found that the OMB Bulletin would have 
downplayed what counted as an adverse health “effect” in such a way 
as to minimize the assessment of cholinesterase-inhibiting effects of 
organophosphate and carbamate insecticides.181 Worse, the NAS 
panel found that OMB’s proposed Bulletin presented steps, in the 
name of science, that would understate risks presented to vulnerable 
subpopulations,182 including especially children, infants, and fetuses.183 
And perhaps most telling of all for the purposes of my argument, the 
proposed Bulletin would have insisted on the Agency communicating 
what OMB thought to be the relevant risk “comparisons,” such as 
whether a risk was hypothetically akin to “being struck by lightning,” 
whereas as to those risks presented by conventional agriculture, the 
proposed Bulletin would have ignored completely that there existed a 
real-life, market-based alternative to pesticide risks—federally 
certified organic foods—for which the comparative data suggest a 
much lower risk of pesticide residues.184 
 
 178. See NAS REPORT, supra note 33, app. E, at 268 (citing EPA comments on the proposed 
Bulletin specifically objecting to the fact that “the proposed Bulletin did indicate that actions 
that involve assessment / reassessment of tolerances for pesticide residues on food would be 
subject to the Bulletin”). 
 179. See id. 
 180. Id. at 7. 
 181. See id. at 57 (“Toxicologic risk assessment of these insecticides could be based on an 
end point related to the mode of action (for example, a drop in acetylcholinesterase to 70% of 
baseline) even if exposed people have no symptoms at that concentration.”). 
 182. See, e.g., id. at 37–39 (criticizing the Bulletin’s use of mean or “central” estimates of risk 
because they do not accurately reflect the risks posed to the most vulnerable populations). 
 183. See id. at 80 (speaking of the need to consider specially vulnerable populations such as 
infants and children and then noting, “[h]owever, if implemented literally and in the absence of 
clarifying language, the bulletin may be interpreted as requiring only quantitative analyses and 
only for the general population”) (emphasis added). 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 112–14. 
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C. Organic Agriculture as a Hedge in a Genetically- and Carbon-
Modified World 
Because it is increasingly legitimate to claim in policy debates 
that there exists value in organic food vis-à-vis the still-uncertain risks 
of pesticide residues, those who belittle organic farming find it 
necessary to shift the reference point from which they argue. They 
now claim that the proper comparative reference point is not the 
conventional, pesticide-based agriculture of the “past,” but new 
systems of agriculture that integrate advances in biotechnology. Using 
the new technologies of genetic engineering, the argument goes, “is 
actually good for humans and the environment, because it allows 
farmers to spray less of the toxic chemicals required to foil pests and 
weeds.”185 Before addressing this argument on its merits, it is worth 
noting at the outset the sleight-of-hand embedded in the new framing: 
pesticides, which in the past were heralded mainly for their benefits 
by opponents of organic agriculture are now to be counted as costs 
from which we can be delivered by genetic engineering.  
That said, however, the new line of argumentation does not 
entirely lack plausibility. The two most common applications of 
bioengineering can at least stake a claim that they might offer health 
and environmental improvements over conventional agriculture. The 
first, so-called “Bt crops,” involves genetically modified seeds that 
replicate within the plants grown from them a naturally occurring 
bacterium, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), that produces a protein which 
can kill pests who ingest it—thereby reducing the need to spray 
insecticides broadly over agricultural fields.186 The second, so-called 
“Roundup Ready crops,” involves crops that are genetically 
engineered to be resistant to Monsanto’s herbicide, Roundup, which 
can in turn be sprayed more freely over both weeds and crops alike—
thereby increasing the ability to use herbicides in “no-till” programs 
 
 185. Sophia Kolehmainen, Genetically Engineered Agriculture: Precaution Before Profits: 
An Overview of Issues in Genetically Engineered Food and Crops, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 285 
(2001) (“Another common claim is that genetic engineering of crops is actually good for humans 
and the environment, because it allows farmers to spray less of the toxic chemicals required to 
foil pests and weeds.”); see also Matthew Rich, Note, The Debate Over Genetically Modified 
Crops in the United States: Reassessment of Notions of Harm, Difference, and Choice, 54 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 889, 893 (2004) (“[S]upporters argue that genetically modified crops feed 
starving populations, reduce pesticide and herbicide use, and conserve environmental 
resources.”); Bailey, supra note 73 (“Finally, no-till farmers use less insecticide, since genetically 
enhanced crops can protect themselves against pests.”). 
 186. Kolehmainen, supra note 185, at 273.  
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that can, among other things, reduce soil erosion and the pollution of 
nearby surface streams from farm run-off.187 The advent of genetic 
engineering in agriculture has been described as “the fastest growing 
agricultural development in history.”188 Bt-corn alone accounts for 
one-third of all corn grown in the United States189 and Roundup 
Ready soybeans account for eighty-five percent of the country’s 
soybean plantings.190 Thus, in terms of modern trends in agriculture, 
genetic engineering and organic agriculture, as different as they may 
be, have both emerged as especially strong, competing agricultural 
paradigms191 and therefore it is hardly implausible to compare them.  
But for the purposes of my argument, it is neither necessary nor 
desirable to compare the two as either-or propositions. Indeed, too 
often policy debates over agriculture are framed as if the world must 
be either an all-organic or all-bioengineered place.192 Yet there is an 
important middle ground that justifies organic agriculture—and 
indeed justifies its expansion beyond (and perhaps even significantly 
beyond) the relatively small amount of total acreage currently under 
organic management. In addition to its other benefits, organic 
agriculture is justified as a form of social insurance—a hedge—against 
the prospect that bioengineered agriculture will fail.193  
And, at least as to the claim of overall pesticide reduction, there 
is evidence that genetically engineered crops are not living up to their 
 
 187. See, e.g., Thomas P. Redick, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Precautionary 
Priority in Biotech Crop Approvals and Containment of Commodities Shipments, 18 COLO. J. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, 83–84 (Winter 2007) (arguing that Roundup Ready soybeans “and 
no-till practices made possible through use of this soybean have increased soil conservation 
measurably”). 
 188. Holly Beth Frompovicz, Comment, A Growing Controversy: Genetic Engineering in 
Agriculture, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 265, 267 (2006). 
 189. Id. at 267. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 29–31 (noting that organic foods constitute the 
fastest growing segment of the agricultural market). 
 192. See, e.g., Ronald Bailey, Billions Served: Norman Borlaug Interviewed by Ronald 
Bailey, REASONONLINE, Apr. 2000, http://www.reason.com/news/show/27665.html (“[I]f all 
agriculture were organic, you would have to increase cropland area dramatically, spreading out 
into marginal areas and cutting down millions of acres of forests.”). 
 193. This justification for organic agriculture is complementary to, but distinct from, the 
more commonly made arguments that genetically engineered agriculture is bad. See, e.g., 
Frompovicz, supra note 188, at 271 (“If the Roundup resistance trait spread to wild grasses, it 
could result in weeds that would be resistant to the most widely used weed killer.”); Rich, supra 
note 185, at 896–97 (describing the genetic contamination of endangered varieties of Mexican 
corn). 
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promise: although Bt crops have reduced insecticide use in many 
crops, herbicide-tolerant (HT) crops, such as those that are 
“Roundup Ready,” have increased it by greater amounts. The reason 
for the increase in HT crop treatments involves the advent of weeds 
that are increasingly tolerant and/or resistant to glyphosate, the active 
ingredient in Roundup which could otherwise be sprayed on fields 
planted with Roundup Ready crops.194 A recent report on long-term 
experience with HT crops finds a predictable pattern: “[i]n the first 
two years of commercial use, each acre planted to HT cotton reduced 
herbicide use by about one-third pound[; e]fficiency slipped in years 
three and four . . . . [and] [b]y year five, weed shifts, tolerance, and 
resistance had pushed total herbicide use on HT acres to a level 0.23 
pounds above total herbicide use on conventional acres.”195 Across all 
crops, genetically engineered varieties reduced pesticide use an 
aggregate 20.6 million pounds from 1996 through 1998, “but from 
1999 through 2004, pesticide use rose 143 million pounds, for a net 
increase of 122 million pounds over the full nine-year period.”196 
Although it is possible that this resistance problem might be 
addressed with active resistance-management programs,197 there have 
been other complications for bioengineered crops. In 2006, a 
university study of Bt cotton in China found that the emergence of 
secondary pests (those not targeted by the Bt insecticide) has 
 
 194. See, e.g., Paul L. Hollis, Herbicide Resistance Major Concern in Cotton, DELTA FARM 
PRESS, Mar. 2, 2007, at 43 (quoting Stanley Culpepper, a University of Georgia weed specialist, 
“As farmers continue to plant successive seasons of Roundup Ready cotton, Roundup Ready 
soybeans and Roundup Ready corn, it’s only a matter of time before glyphosate resistance 
occurs”); Jim Langcuster, Herbicide Resistance Haunts Growers, SE. FARM PRESS, Feb. 14, 2007, 
at 14 (“With mounting concern, weed scientists throughout the region—and the world—are 
cataloguing a growing list of weeds that have developed resistance to glyphosate, which 
comprises the cornerstone of crop planting systems throughout the Southeast.”); David Howe, 
Sizing Up Glyphosate Complaints, CORN & SOYBEAN DIG., Jan. 1, 2007, at 19 (indicating that 
Indiana and Illinois are among states where glysophate resistance has been documented). 
 195. Charles M. Benbrook, Genetically Engineered Crops and Pesticide Use in the United 
States: The First Nine Years 26 (BioTech InfoNet Technical Paper No. 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.biotech-info.net/technicalpaper7.html (emphasis added) (adding that, even after the 
five-year mark, the rapid rise of glysophate-resistant marestail triggered, in 2004, “an estimated 
10 percent increase in the average pounds of herbicides applied per acre”).  
 196. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
 197. See Monsanto Launches Online Weed Resistance Program, DELTA FARM PRESS, Mar. 
30, 2007, at 20 (“Monsanto is launching an online Weed Resistance Risk Assessment Program 
for growers who use Roundup Ready weed control technology.”). 
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required farmers, after seven years, “to use just as much pesticide as 
they did with conventional crops.”198 
Against the possibility that bioengineered agriculture might not 
fully live up to its environmental claims, the possibility of sustainable 
gains from organic agriculture is especially noteworthy. In 2005, a 22-
year longitudinal study in the United States comparing conventional 
and organic farming of corn and soybeans found that yields were 
generally identical even though the organic fields used 30 percent less 
energy, less water, and no pesticides.199 Although these results are not 
generalizable to all crops,200 even modest decreases in yield in organic 
systems might be offset by environmental gains elsewhere. Thus, a 
Swiss study that also compared (different) organic and conventional 
farming systems across a 20-year period found that, despite decreases 
in yield for some crops, organic farms produced their crops more 
“efficiently”: with less energy, greater water retention by the soil, and 
a higher presence of beneficial insects.201 The existence of an 
agricultural production system such as organic farming may be an 
 
 198. See, e.g., Steve Connor, Farmers Use As Much Pesticide With GM Crops, US Study 
Finds, INDEP., July 27, 2006, at 23 (“Secondary pests, such as a type of leaf bug called mirids, are 
not normally a problem in cotton fields because bollworm, and sprays against bollworm, tend to 
keep them in check. However, because Bt cotton is targeted mainly against bollworm, other 
pests are able to exploit the relatively low use of pesticide that such fields need.”); Clive 
Cookson, GM Cotton Crop Develops New Pests, FIN. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at 7 (citing a joint 
study by Cornell University and the Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy that found that 
“[m]ost of the benefits of growing genetically modified cotton, the only commercial GM crop in 
China, have disappeared after seven years”); Molly McElroy, Pest Concerns Raised in Modified-
Seed Study Chinese Cotton Farmers Using Monsanto Product Face Secondary Pests, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, July 26, 2006, at A10 (“The researchers found that in the first three years of 
using Bt cotton, the Chinese farmers cut pesticide use by 70 percent and earned 36 percent more 
income than farmers using traditional cotton. But the environmental and economic benefits did 
not last. After seven years, the Bt cotton farmers were using as much pesticide as non-Bt users, 
even as they were paying for seeds that cost two to three times as much . . . .”).  
 199. See Susan S. Lang, Organic Farming Produces Same Corn and Soybean Yields as 
Conventional Farms, but Consumes Less Energy and no Pesticides, Study Finds, CORNELL 
UNIV. NEWS SERVICE, July 13, 2005, http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/July05/organic.farm.vs. 
other.ssl.html (reporting on research published in the journal Bioscience by Dr. David 
Pimentel). 
 200. Id. (“Organic farming can compete effectively in growing corn, soybeans, wheat, barley 
and other grains, Pimentel said, but it might not be as favorable for growing such crops as 
grapes, apples, cherries and potatoes, which have greater pest problems.”). 
 201. See Bailey, supra note 73, at 2–4 (describing a study by Swiss scientists at the Research 
Institute for Organic Agriculture finding that organic plots were “on average 20 percent less 
productive than conventional plots” with some mineral depletion but that the organic plots were 
more “efficient” due to the lesser amount of energy used to produce the crops, greater water 
retention by the soil, and “higher presence of beneficial insects”). 
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especially valuable asset in an age of global warming, when both 
temperatures and drought are expected to increase due to the 
cumulative effects of such greenhouse gases as carbon dioxide.202 In 
such a carbon-modified world, organic systems could be expected to 
deliver “higher yields [than conventional systems], especially under 
drought conditions [because] wind and water erosion degraded the 
soil on the conventional farm while the soil on the organic farm 
steadily improved in organic matter, moisture, microbial activity and 
other soil quality indicators.”203 Moreover, the more energy-efficient 
organic systems could reduce in the first place emissions of 
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere from lower, farm-related fossil 
fuel use.204 
The point of the comparison, although modest, is important. 
Even when measured against the newer worlds of genetically 
engineered crops and global warming, the existence of a vibrant 
organic agricultural sector is an important national (indeed, global) 
asset that is justified on policy, and not simply “marketing,” grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
When Congress enacted the Organic Food Production Act in 
1990 it stepped onto the “other road” suggested by Rachel Carson 
several decades earlier. With the relatively simple expedient of a 
certification regime, the OFPA is perhaps one of our best examples of 
cause-based environmental reforms that support fundamental change 
in production systems toward more ecological and sustainable ends. 
Organic agriculture, whether measured against conventional or 
bioengineered agricultural systems, is more than an idea whose time 
 
 202. See, e.g., Caroline Patton, An Environmentalist’s Unlikely Foe: The Use of Hypothetical 
Jurisdiction in Massachusetts v. EPA, 30 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 173, 182 (2006) 
(“Most scientists expect global warming to result in rising sea levels, increased storms and 
drought, and a general disruption of the earth’s ecosystems.”); Bradford C. Monk, Standing and 
Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 15 (2005) (“Global warming 
would also likely produce erratic and severe weather patterns that would increase both the 
duration and intensity of droughts . . . .”). 
 203. Lang, supra note 199 (reporting on actual results from a U.S. study on yields from 
organic fields during drought conditions). 
 204. DAVID PIMENTEL, IMPACTS OF ORGANIC FARMING ON EFFICIENCY OF ENERGY USE 
IN AGRICULTURE 8, available at http://www.organic-center.org/reportfiles/ENERGY_SSR.pdf 
(“A comparison of the model organic and conventional system suggests a 31 percent energy 
saving in the organic system . . . .”). 
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has come. It is an effective, proven policy alternative whose day 
should be just beginning. 
